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The Effects
of Tax Exemption on Investment
by Industrial Firms in Colombia
By
Richard E. Bilsborrow and Richard C. Porter
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III. Economic Assessment of Exemptions. - IV. Profitability of Exempt
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T ax incentives are one of the most widely used policies for the stim-
ulation of industrial expansion in developing countries: "Today
virtually all developing countries ... offer inducements to ap-
proved enterprises in the form of reductions in or exemptions from ...
income taxes for given periods of time"1. Despite much accumulated
experience, disagreement still exists about their effectiveness. Fiscal
Remark: The research for this paper was begun by Mr. Bilsborrow while in Colombia
on a Fulbright - Hays Grant in 1965-66. He wishes to thank the Centro de Estudios Sobre
Desarrollo Econ6mico, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, for its assistance. We have both
benefited greatly from the cooperation of many Colombian businessmen and government
officials, from comments on earlier drafts by colleagues in the Colombian Department of
Planning and the University of Michigan, and from criticism by participants in the 1968
Harvard Development Advisory Service Conference at Sorrento, Italy. This paper in no
way represents an official position, and errors that remain are ours.
1 George E. Lent, "Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing Countries", Inter-
national Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, Vol. XIV, Washington, D. C., 1967, p. 249. Lent
summarizes the characteristics of tax incentive legislation in thirteen developing countries
but does not carry out any empirical analysis. - A careful earlier survey of theoretical and
administrative aspects of tax incentives in developing countries, also non-empirical, is
found in Jack Heller and Kenneth M. Kauffman, Tax Incentives for Industry in Less Developed
Countries, Harvard Law School, International Program in Taxation, Cambridge, 1963. - Tax
incentives for industry, inspired by the economic philosophy of Radl Prebisch, have been
especially attractive inducements to Latin American governments. See Ranl Prebisch,
"Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries", The American Economic Review,
Vol. XLIX, Menasha, Wisc., 1959, Papers and Proceedings, pp. 251 sqq. - Pedro Mendive,
"Tax Incentives in Latin America", United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Latin America,
Vol. IX, New York, 1964, pp. 103 sqq.
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experts generally denigrate tax exemption. Economists' opinions vary
from quite negative, i. e., "... tax considerations are probably only
infrequently of any significant consequence in a business decision"1;
to quite positive, i. e., "I have taken pleasure in attempting to 'debunk' .. .
those who seek to discredit such proved industrial incentives as tax
exemption" 2. Unfortunately, empirical studies of tax incentives in devel-
oping countries are few and more aggregative than desirable3 . In this
paper the effects of tax exemptions in Colombia during the period 1960-66
will be examined in an effort to add more explicit empirical evidence
to the debate. The basic question here is: To what extent have Colombia's
tax exemptions encouraged firms to enter (or to expand in) areas of
industry they otherwise would not have chosen?
In the fundamental reform of tax laws in 1960, Colombia offered
exemption from major income taxes (for up to ten years, 1960-69) to
firms which entered certain "basic" sectors of industry (such firms are
hereafter called "basic") or which produced goods "complementary"
to the production of iron and steel (i. e., firms which used as intermediate
goods the products of the government-sponsored steel firm; such firms
are hereafter called "complementary"). During the seven years, 1960-66,
100 different firms achieved this exemption in at least one year, for a
total of 288 firm-years of exemptions. Since there are approximately
12,000 manufacturing establishments in Colombia4, the number of tax-
exempt firms seems few. Nevertheless, the shareholder equity of these
at-some-time-exempt firms is around 700 million pesos5, which represents
nearly io percent of the total equity of all manufacturing industry.
The total revenue loss during the seven years was about 16o million
pesos. The annual loss in both 1965 and 1966 was around 50 million pesos,
which was over 6 percent of total corporate income and excess profits
tax receipts in each year.
1 Stanford G. Ross and John B. Christensen, Tax Incentives for Industry in Mexico,
Harvard Law School, International Program in Taxation, Cambridge, 1959, p. ix.
a Murray D. Bryce, Policies and Methods for Industrial Development, McGraw-Hill
Series in International Development, New York, 1965, pp. V sq.
8 Two such examples are Milton C. Taylor, Industrial Tax-Exemption in Puerto Rico,
A Case Study in the Use of Tax Subsidies for Industrializing Underdeveloped Areas, Madison,
1957. - Paul L. Chen-Young, "A Study of Tax Incentives in Jamaica", National Tax
Journal, Vol. XX, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, pp. 292 sqq. - A more careful analysis, for the
United States, is Robert M. Coen, "Effects of Tax Policy on Investment in Manufacturing",
The American Economic Review, Vol. LVIII, 1968, Papers and Proceedings, pp. 200 sqq.
4 In 1965, according to Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, Boletin
Mensual de Estadistica, Akio XVI, Bogota, agosto, 1967, p. 27.
5 One peso was worth about (= .ii) U. S. dollars in 1965.
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The organization of the paper is as follows: Section I offers some
historical background to the 1960 tax-exemption statute. Section II
briefly reviews certain administrative procedures and problems. Sections
III to V contain the economic evidence. And finally, Section VI summarizes
the evidence and presents policy implications.
I. Background
There is a long history of the use of tax exemptions in Colombia as
a stimulus to the growth of certain industries1. Soon after independence
was achieved, exemptions from import duties and various internal taxes
were granted for the purpose of developing domestic manufactures.
The number and magnitude of exemptions continued to grow throughout
the nineteenth century, and accelerated in the twentieth once the govern-
ment became generally empowered to concede exemptions whenever
these promised to lead to the initiation of new industries. Before 1940,
however, all such exemptions tended to be granted on an ad hoc basis.
Exemption legislation for specific firms continues to exist today (for
tourist hotels, auto assembly, etc.), but has been much surpassed in
importance by the more general aws with which this paper is concerned.
The "modern" era of exemptions had its beginnings in the 1930's,
when the Constitution was amended and Congress gave the administra-
tion extensive powers in the field of economic policy. With these new
powers, the government established the Industrial Development Institute
and called for the adoption of a development plan. The industrial part
of this plan was supposed to identify areas of basic importance in which
national raw materials were utilized. Although no explicit general defini-
tion of "areas of basic importance" was at that time offered, the list of 22
industrial fields which qualified implicitly suggests that industries were
considered basic when they produced something which had not been
produced in Colombia previously. Unfortunately, World War II made the
necessary capital goods imports unavailable, and even after the war,
the small magnitude and duration of the tax exemption (and the pre-
requisites) resulted in only two firms availing themselves of it2.
Thus, while one of the 22 fields exempted in 1940 was iron and steel
production, it soon became clear that a much greater government effort
was needed if an iron and steel industry was to be established. With theI Luis Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion en Colombia, 1810-1930, Medellin, Colom-
bia, 1955, P. 214.
2 Alberto Silva and Tito Luis Caldas, R6gimen legal de la industria en Colombia, Bogota,
1956, p. 34 note. The relevant laws and decrees for points made in the two paragraphs above
are, chronologically, Law 22 and Decree 1,143 of 1908, Article 32 of the Constitution and
Law 54 of 1939, and Decrees 1,157 and 1,439 of 1940.
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aid of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
plans were made for the "Empresa Sideriirgica Nacional de Paz del Rio"'
which was to receive such privileges as 20-year exemption from all taxes
(including tariffs on imports), preferential treatment of import license
applications, and compulsory financial contributions from private indus-
try in the form of purchases of Paz del Rio bonds2.
In 1960 the income tax of Colombia was overhauled3 and a new system
of general tax exemptions promulgated. Corporations and other forms
of business organization formed prior to December 31, 1965, whose
"sole purpose" is the exploitation of an economic activity classified by
the Department of Planning as "basic" or "complementary" and whose
raw materials used in their production processes are at least 6o percent
of domestic origin (or 50 percent from Paz del Rio, for "complementary"
firms), are entitled to exemption (usually 100 percent) from income taxes
through 19694. The entire "complementary" exemption is best viewed
as a disguised subsidy to Paz del Rio since it induces Paz del Rio customers
to buy a larger quantity and/or pay a higher price than otherwise5.
While the "complementary" firms were clearly defined, the "basic"
firms were not except in the form of a series of Department of Planning
resolutions listing the specific industrial areas which qualified. The 21
areas consisted of extraction and processing of various ores, fishing,
wool processing, and the production of various chemicals, petro-chemicals,
paper products, fertilizers, artificial fibres, iron and steel, machines and
machine tools, and tanning extracts. As most of these products were
principally imported by Colombia at this time, the concept of "basic"
appears to have become, by 1960, synonymous with import-substituting
manufacture (see Section VI, point (c) below).
1 Later "Acerias Paz del Rio;" hereafter referred to simply as "Paz del Rio." For a
history of the financing and operation of Paz del Rio, see John A. King, Jr., Economic Develop-
ment Projects and Their Appraisal, Cases and Principles from the Experience of the World
Bank, Baltimore, 1967, Case 30.
* In addition, it was necessary to insure that there would be buyers for the products
of Paz del Rio. Therefore, firms which purchased 8o percent of their raw materials from Paz
del Rio were exempted for a period of up to ten years (during 1954-63) from income, wealth,
and excess profits taxes and from duties on imported capital equipment. It is difficult to
discover how many firms received such tax exemption between 1954 and 1960 (when the
decree was superseded), but there were surely several.
3 The details are described in Harvard Law School, International Program in Taxation,
Taxation in Colombia, By George Jackson Eder, John C. Chommie and Hector Julio Becerra,
World Tax Series, Chicago, 1964, pp. 325 sqq.
4 Resolution 197 of 1961, as modified by Resolutions 78 and 127 of 1962, 74 of 1964,
and 225 of 1966.
5 See p. 420, footnote 2.
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II. Administration of Exemptions
The effectiveness of a tax incentive program is to an important degree
determined by its administration. We will see that it is necessary to keep
in mind the administrative shortcomings in an economic evaluation
of the Colombian tax exemptions. This review of Colombian procedures
is also valuable because the Colombian experience provides such clear
lessons to others.
Firms which wish to enjoy exemption privileges must deal with three
different agencies: the Ministry of Development, the Superintendency
of Corporations, and the Ministry of Finance'. The extent of the paperwork
alone partly or completely offset the value of the exemption for many
small firms. More important, the lack of clear definition of responsibilities
and communication between the three agencies led to further inefficiency
and confusion. To some extent the problems followed from the troika
structure; to some extent they were the result of carelessly or vaguely
worded laws and decrees.
The Ministry of Development first approves, initially and each year
thereafter, a firm's status as "basic" by means of an annual resolution.
The Ministry of Finance, in turn, grants exemptions for "complementary"
firms without regard to a Ministry of Development resolution and without
any real ability to verify the 50 percent Paz del Rio purchase require-
ment2 .
Finally, all "basic" and "complementary" firms must submit to the
"vigilance" of the Superintendency of Corporations, but the Super-
intendency often does not know who the exempt firms area. While each
of the three organizations is empowered to make on-site inspections
to ensure compliance with the "sole purpose" and import content require-
ments, in the only year for which evidence was available we found only
three out of seven exempt firms were actually visited
4. All this is not
to say that the troika is intrinsically unworkable (in Colombia, some such
1 All such translations of government organizations are our own.
2 For "basic" firms, the legal department of the Ministry of Finance has publicly declared
that the annual resolution is not necessary. Its tax examiners have rejected this legal opinion
but still occasionally grant exemption in the absence of a Ministry of Development resolution.
8 In fact, none of the Government organizations knows exactly who the "complementary"
firms are, nor can this be known without searching past corporate tax declarations. The
Ministry of Development knows the "basic" firms (except those accepted by the Ministry
of Finance without a Ministry of Development resolution), but does not even report this list
to the Superintendency of Corporations. As a result, the Superintendency of Corporations
does not have complete financial records for either group of exempt firms (see the Appendix).
4 Actually, the Superintendency of Corporations is empowered to make visits to all
corporations every year to verify financial records, but because of insufficient staff only
about io percent of the corporations are visited in any year.
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division of labor and power is perhaps inevitable) but that a clear division
of responsibility is necessary, and regular channels of interagency com-
munication must be maintained.
Furthermore, a great deal of uncertainty has been caused by the Ministry
of Development's interpretation of the law. Its decision to re-appraise
each year the status of each "basic" firm has had unfortunate economic
results. In place of a prior, secure tax exemption, potential exempt
firms had to act in the face of uncertain exemption and possible long
delays before receiving a decision. The extent of uncertainty is illustrated
by the fact that "basic" status, once achieved by a firm, was renewed in
only 66 percent of the subsequent years'.
The critical lesson of this is the need for consistency over time. A
firm should be able to get a decision as to its status before it undertakes
or expands operations, and that status should be essentially irrevocable
for a fixed period of time, provided the firm continues to fulfill certain
clearly specified conditions. That the Colombian system extensively
failed in this respect is witnessed by the fact that, of the more than thirty
at-some-time-exempt firms with which we conversed or corresponded,
about half voluntarily complained of administrative uncertainties2.
A further shortcoming in the handling of the exemptions is the timing
of the law and its implementation. The exemptions were to last up to
ten years (1960-69, inclusive), but the law itself was not passed until
December 22, 1960, and the various implementing decrees and resolutions
were still being issued well into 1962. As a result, all the eventual exemptions
for the early years assumed a windfall nature. Furthermore, few firms
received exemptions for the first years3 . Thus, if all the 71 firms that were
exempt as "basic" at some time during 1960--66 receive exemptions
in each of 1967, 1968, and 1969, they will have enjoyed less than six
years' exemption on the average. The combination of the fact that firms
1 Even "complementary" firms have been subject to this kind of uncertainty despite
their more precise definition and freedom from Ministry of Development resolution. There
have been cases where Paz del Rio was unable (or refused) to continue supplying the steel
needs of a particular "complementary" firm, with the result that the firm lost its tax-exempt
status.
2 This is particularly significant because the questions in both the interviews and corre-
spondence were open-ended, with the result that the responses could not have been influenced
by suggested answers.
8 Two of the reasons for this are that two-thirds of the at-some-time-exempt firms had
not yet been established by the start of the exemption statute, and that the newly-established
firms frequently did not earn sufficient profits to merit seeking exempt status in their first
few years. For the at-some-time-exempt firms for which there are data, 44 percent earned
zero or negative profits in the year of their establishment, 36 percent in the next year, and
22 percent two years later. For unprofitable firms exemption has no value.
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are exempt through 1969 but that they must exist by December 31,
1965, to be eligible, means that firms which may be equally worthy
receive income tax exemption for anywhere from four (1966-69) to
ten years. Indeed, the firms which establish themselves in 1965, which
may be more needy since they are just beginning production, receive
exemption for a much shorter period than a firm which may have existed
for many years.
Thus the implementation and administration of the Colombian tax-
exemption system has been to varying degrees uncertain, arbitrary,
dilatory, and uncoordinated. While we cannot quantify the impact
of these administrative failings upon its effectiveness, there can be little
doubt that this impact has been significantly negative, in the sense
that the investment stimulated has surely been less than it could have
been under more efficient administration.
III. Economic Assessment of Exemptions
An economic assessment of the effectiveness of tax exemptions is
difficult. Ideally, we should like to know how differently the at-some-
time-exempt firms would have acted if they had known (throughout the
period, 1960-69) that they would not receive any exemptions. One
obvious approach is to ask the firms how the possibility (or hope) of
exemption had affected their decisions. There are, however, two diffi-
culties. First, what businessmen say and what they do may differ greatly';
second, the sample of respondents to the question is almost certainly
biased2. On the second difficulty, for example, we sought to converse
or correspond with executives of all the 100 at-some-time-exempt firms,
but the 30-odd with which we succeeded were clearly not a random sample.
Though this group was similar to the entire 1oo in its visible attributes3,
it consisted, in almost equal parts, of extreme allies and extreme enemies
of exemption. While this is not a surprising result4, it does induce skepti-
cism about generalizing from the information offered.
1 The methodological problems are likely to be even more severe than those discussed
by Robert Eisner in his Determinants of Capital Expenditures: An Interview Study, Studies
in Business Expectations' and Planning, No. 2, Urbana, 1956.
2 In fact, the "population" to which such a question can be addressed is incorrectly
defined since it would have been a Herculean task to discover in the archives of the Ministry
of Development the names of firms which solicited but never received exemption. The "pop-
ulation" being considered in this paper, therefore, consists of firms whose exemption hopes
were, by 1966, at least once realized.
3 I. e., its composition with respect to number of years exempt, size, type of exemption,
age, etc.
4 Since those who have been most favored or most disillusioned by the exemption system
would seem the most likely to respond.
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Nevertheless, these conversations and letters did suggest that there
were two ways in which firms' decisions may have been favorably affected
by the exemption law. First, many firms said they had initiated operations
in response to the hope of exemptions; and second, some firms were
able to expand more rapidly through reinvestment of profits once they
began receiving exemption. To attempt to quantify these effects on the
basis of possibly self-serving declarations' would have been dangerous,
unless a large sample of long and careful interviews had been obtained.
And even then the serious methodological problems would remain.
Another approach to the question, how did the hope of exemption
affect investment decisions, lies in the analysis of the investment decision
making process. If we knew what factors "caused" investment, then
knowledge of how exemption affects these factors would show how
exemption affects investment. One method of determining what factors
were at least associated with investment is multiple regression. We might
have tried to determine by multiple regression the relation between
investment and other variables (such as internal funds, accelerator, etc.)
for the exempt firms before they became exempt - i. e., their investment
function. Then one could substitute exempt-period data (a) for the firms
including their exemptions, and (b) for the firms excluding exemptions,
in the estimated equation, and calculate the difference - i. e., the amount
of additional investment occurring under exemption from what would
have occurred otherwise.
The principal difficulties encountered in this approach are (i) that
it is not firmly established (even in the literature about the developed
countries2 what factors enter the investment-decision function and how
they enter, and (2) that some of the important factors are nonobservable,
chiefly because they refer to the ex ante expectations of the firm. Finally,
the lack of the necessary data - partly caused by two-thirds of the exempt
firms not existing before the tax-exempt period - made the approach
above unfeasible3.
1 Self-serving in that a continuation of the exemptions into the 1970's was then being
considered.
2 A substantial effort was made in attempting to examine the applicability of investment
theory to less developed countries by Richard E. Bilsborrow, The Determinants of Fixed
Investment by Manufacturing Corporations in Colombia (unpubl. Ph. D. thesis, University of
Michigan, 1968), Ch. 3. Unfortunately, the econometric results are, in his words, "not terribly
convincing" (p. 136).
8 One small piece of econometric evidence from the source above is of interest in the
present context. Data were obtained for 68 firms (of which 8 were exempt from income taxes).
A cross-section regression of investment on net internal funds and sales growth should have
resulted in positive residuals for the exempt firms if the incentive/profitability effects on
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Therefore, the empirical approach taken here will be noneconometric.
In the next section the ex post profitability of the tax-exempt firms is
examined on the assumptions that the ex ante profitability of an invest-
ment is an important factor in the investment decision and that the
realized rate of profitability can give us some insight into the rate of
profitability that had earlier been expected. In Section V the potential
influence of tax exemption on investment through the availability of
internal funds is investigated. Section VI will summarize the results of
Sections IV and V and suggest policy implications.
IV. Profitability of Exempt Firms
We were able to calculate the average before- and after-tax1 profit
rates (on book value of shareholder equity) for 78 of the 100 at-some-time-
exempt firms2. The weighted (by 1966 equity of each firm) average
before-tax and after-tax profit rates of all firms in the sample were 21.1 per-
cent and 11.7 percent, respectively. As Table i indicates the variance
in these averages was large. Thus, if all the at-some-time-exempt firms
were exempt in all years, the exemption would have nearly doubled their
average profit rate. Unfortunately, this says little about the effectiveness
of exemption. In the first place, these profit rates mean little unless
compared in some way with those of nonexempt firms. This is our first job.
Later a theoretical framework will be developed to analyze the effectiveness
of exemption on stimulating investment.
Table i - Distribution of Firms by Profit Rates
Before-tax Number
profit rate (percent) of firms
Negative . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
o to 9.99 . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10 to 19.99 . . . . . . . . . . . 13
20 to 29.99 . . . . . . . . . . . 14
30 to 39.99.-.......... - 7
40to 4 9.99 . . . . . . . . . . . 11
50 to 99.99 . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Greater than 00 . . . . . . . . . 7
investment were important (liquidity effects already having been included in the funds
variable). However, this was not the case: residuals for the at-some-time-exempt firms
summed to about zero.
1 I. e., the after-tax profit rate that the firms would have had if they had not been exempt
at all during the period.
2 All the empirical work is based upon this group of 78 firms, hereafter called "the sample."
See the Appendix for a description of sources, data and procedures.
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For nonexempt firms the only comparable (before-tax) profit data
which exist are for manufacturing corporations1. For all manufacturing
corporations (including the tax-exempt), the before-tax profit data varied
during 1960-66, from 17.7 percent (in 1965) to 25.1 percent (in 1963),
and averaged 20.1 percent over these seven years. This is almost exactly
the same as the average before-tax profit rate (weighted by 1966 equity),
20.4 percent, of the 47 at-some-time-exempt corporations in the sample.
(The other 31 firms in the sample were limited liability companies - see
the Appendix.)
This near equality of ex post profit rates casts doubt on the usual
belief that profit expectations in the exempt areas were too meager for
entry to have occurred without special inducement2 . This may be true
for those exempt areas in which few or no firms appeared, but for those
exempt areas in which firms exist, the evidence is against it. Indeed, the
exempt "basic" firms have tended to enter largely in a few already
established fields of production: While there are 21 different industries
that qualified for "basic" exemption, 51 of the 71 at-some-time-exempt
"basic" firms produced in only four of these (coal, iron and steel, machines
and machine tools, and fishing)a3, and these four areas were the ones in
which significant national production already existed in 1960. This strongly
suggests at the outset hat tax exemption may have been redundant in the
established areas and an insufficient inducement in the not-yet-established
ones.
Further evidence about the effectiveness of exemption is offered by
the division of the sample into corporations and limited liability com-
panies4. The differential impact of tax exemption on the two groups is
1 This data is collected by the Superintendency of Corporations (Superintendencia de
Sociedades An6nimas), Bogota, and is published annually in its Revista. In Colombia there
are two types of "corporations", the sociedades an6nimas and the sociedades limitadas. The
former are like the U. S. corporation, but the latter, "limited liability companies," are more
uniquely Colombian and combine various features of the corporation and the multiple
partnership. For the purposes of this paper, the critical difference lies in the tax rates. The
corporation pays a progressive corporate income tax ranging from 12 to 36 percent, and is
liable to an excess-profits tax; the limited liability company pays a progressive income tax
ranging from 4 to 12 percent and is not liable to any excess-profits tax. In this study "corpora-
tions" will be used to refer only to the first group, while "limited liability companies" will
be used for the second group.2 At the least, it would be necessary to explain why realized profits typically exceeded
expectations in these areas (and not elsewhere).
8 In seven other designated areas not a single firm entered (or existed before).
' The limited liability companies comprise 40 percent of the number of firms in the sample,
but only 4 percent of the total (1966) equity. Only three of them received over ioo,ooo pesos
worth of total exemption, and none over 1,ooo,ooo pesos, whereas three-fourths of the cor-
porations received over ioo,ooo, and nearly half over i,ooo,ooo pesos of exemption, over
the 1960-66 period.
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shown by the figures for before-tax and after-tax profit rates; taxes would
have reduced the weighted average profit rate of corporations from
20.4 percent to 10.7 percent and that of limited liability companies from
39.0 percent to 35.8 percent. Thus, exemption in all years would have
nearly doubled the average profit rate of corporations but increased that of
limited liability companies by less than one-tenth. While the fact that the
limited liability companies were going to turn out profitably may not have
been fully recognized beforehand by their owners, they knew well that
exemption from corporate income taxes could never benefit them much'.
In sum, ex post profit rate averages suggest that the tax-exemption
system had least effect in inducing investment (i) in untried areas of
production and (2) by limited liability companies.
But aggregates of several firms may hide interesting intragroup
differences. In the remainder of this section, we will look at the 78 firms
in the sample individually in an effort to say something about their
division into two groups: (1) those that would still have been established
(or expanded substantially as much) in the absence of exemptions, and (2)
those that would not. Here we assume that the vital factor in the invest-
ment decision function is the expected profitability of an investment (or,
what ordinarily gives the same results, the anticipated present value
of the investment). Theoretically, then, the critical distinction lies in the
division between investments whose anticipated present value is (i)
negative in the absence of tax exemption but positive with exemption,
and (2) positive even in the absence of tax exemption (though of course
greater with exemption), or negative even with exemption2 .
To develop this distinction, let us consider a firm (or investment)
in which one peso is invested in the year zero. Each year thereafter (at
least up to the horizon of the investor) the depreciated part of this capital
is replaced so that the real capital investment of one peso is maintained3 .
The anticipated real net cash inflow (hereafter called profit) per peso of
investment is p pesos each year (again, at least up to the horizon of the
investor).
This profit is to be tax-free for the first "a" years of the investment and
thereafter will be taxed at a rate i. The investor calculates his present
' This is because the marginal income tax of limited liability companies could not
exceed 12 percent.
a In their survey of tax incentives in developing countries, Heller and Kauffman (op.
cit.) have parts of two chapters on this subject, Chapter 5, "Procedure for Evaluating the
Effect of Incentives on Profitability", and Chapter 4, Section C, "Exemption as Incentives."
But their theoretical approach is concerned with the effects of exemption on present value
rather than whether it makes a critical difference in ex ante profitability, and hence in the
investment decision.
a "Real" means in year zero prices.
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(real) value using a discount rate r, and his horizon is assumed to be b
years1. The present value of a peso of such investment (with "a" years of
initial tax exemption), written Va, is:
a b
(I) Va = -1 + pfe dt+ p(1--i) fer
t dt
0 a
where t is time2. After integration, Va can be written:
1
(2) Va - (p-r) -pie-ra__p (1-i) e-rbr
For some tax-exemption period of "a" years (0 a < b) to be effective -
in the sense of inducing an investment that would not otherwise be made
- it is necessary (but not sufficient - see below) that the anticipated
present value be negative if no exemption were offered (i. e., if a = 0)
and be positive if exemption were offered throughout the anticipated life
of the investment (i. e., if a = b)a3. If VO (i. e., the present value without
any tax exemption) is positive, the investor would undertake the invest-
ment in the absence of exemption. If Vb (i. e., the present value with
"lifelong" exemption of "b" years) is negative, the investor would not
undertake the project even if he were granted complete tax exemption
over the entire expected economic life of the investment.
We find the present value without exemption is:
1
(3) VO -= [---r + p ( ) 1-e-- )]r
And the present value with "lifelong" exemption is:
1
(4) Vb=--- [--- r + p ( 1 -- e- rbl .r
It is necessary to find the conditions in which:
(5) VO < 0 < Vb.
These conditions are:
r
(6) p (1- i) < __e_,b < p.
1 The use of a short horizon is, while not the best, a common way to handle the uncertainty
of distant flows. What it means in the present context is that a piece of equipment is assumed
to generate no revenue b years after its installation.
a d represents the differential, and e is the Napierian 2.718.
8 Increasing "a" beyond b would have no effect on the investor's decision, by the defini-
tion of b.
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In words, these two conditions require that the after-tax profit rate be
less than a certain quantity and that the before-tax profit rate be greater
than that same quantity. That critical quantity, hereafter called CQ, is
plotted in the figure for various values of r and for b equal to 3, 5 and
10 years.
It is clear from the figure that the CQ is very sensitive to the investor's
rate of discount, r, and, to a lesser extent, sensitive to his horizon, b.
We would like to know both for particular firms, but this is impossible.
Sincenominal interest rates in Colombia vary from .15 to .35, real interest
rates must lie in the range, .05 to .25 (w:th the roughly io percent per
year inflation of the early 1960's). Moreover, it seems reasonable to place
investor horizons in the range of 3 to 10 years, with 5 years perhaps
most likely. Under these suppositions, the CQ may lie anywhere from
about .10 (with r low and b high) to .40 (with r high and b low). Thus,
for exemptions to be effective, the after-tax profit rate must be less than
some CQ in the range, .10 to .40, and the before-tax profit rate must
be above that CQ.
While the theory developed in the preceding paragraphs is simple,
its application to the present problem is made tenuous by several con-
siderations. First, the theoretical framework is at best a naive approxima-
tion of the complex process by which firms decide to enter (or expand
their commitment in) a particular line of production. While no one would
deny that expected profitability is an important ingredient in that de-
cision, it is certainly not the only ingredient nor necessarily the most
important. Second, any actually calculated profit rates must be based
upon the firm's own accounts, which may not be accurate reflections
of economic reality. Nevertheless, attempts to adjust the accounts to
correct distortions quickly enter the realm of the arbitrary. Third, the
calculated profit rates are ex post, whereas the firms' decisions must
have been motivated by their possibly very different ex ante profit
expectations'.
The conclusion of the theoretical framework above is that, in the
absence of precise information about firms' horizons and discount rates,
we must accept the possibility that tax exemption was effective if there
1 In fact, the correlation between ex ante and ex post profit rates was only .13 for a
group of British firms. See C. F. Carter and B. R. Williams, Investment in Innovation, London,
New York, Toronto, 1958, p. go.
In addition, the time shape of the profitability of an investment is not usually uniform
over its life, as the above model assumes: While the theory could be readily extended to
consider varying time shapes, such a course would not meet the real problem that it cannot
be known from what part of a profit flow varying over the firm's life cycle the data for particu-
lar years derive. These considerations imply that the utmost caution must be used in drawing
conclusions about the effectiveness of exemptions from ex post profit data.
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is any CQ value between .10 and .40 that is both greater than the after-
tax profit rate and less than the before-tax profit rate. For nearly half
the firms in the sample there is no such CQ: both the before-tax and after-
tax profit rates are above .40 for 16 firms, and both the before-tax and
after-tax profit rates are below .io for 19 firms'. It is illuminating to
examine these two groups more carefully.
1 We could carry the analysis above further and compare actual firm before- and after-tax
profit rates with diferent CQ's. If we assume all firms are equal in the sense of having the same
CQ, the maximum number of firms that might have been stimulated to invest by profitability
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The 16 firms whose profit rates in the 1960's would have been above
.40 even if they had paid taxes consisted almost entirely of small' limited
liability companies that were established in the 1960's. It is tempting
to conclude that these high ex post p rofitability rates must have been
to some extent anticipated and hence tax-exempt status to a correspond-
ing extent unnecessary to stimulate the firms' investments. However,
this may not follow because small limited liability companies are more
likely to have high CQ's, relative to either big firms, which would
presumably have longer horizons, or corporations for whom the appro-
priate discount rate (or external cost of funds) is surely lower.
At the other end of the profit rate distribution, there were 19 at-
some-time-exempt firms whose before-tax profit rates were less than
.10. In composition, this group is quite similar to the entirety of at-
some-time-exempt firms, their sole differentiating characteristic being
that they have clearly not (yet) benefited much, if at all, from tax exemp-
tion. To the extent that these firms entered (or expanded) with full
recognition that their operations would probably not become profitable
until the late 1960's, the promise of tax exemption cannot have provided
much stimulus. On the other hand, to the extent that these firms rep-
resent the low end of a high-variance distribution around ex ante profit
expectations, the hope of tax exemption may still have been important
in their decision.
The analysis above has assumed that all exempt firms have the
same CQ. But firms in different activities are likely to have not only
different investment horizons (b) and access to external funds (and hence
r), but also different levels of risk, tariff protection, degrees of competi-
tion from non-exempt firms that fail to meet one of the legal requirements,
etc., all of which will affect the CQ's. While it is impossible to adjust for
these factors, we can compare individual firm profit rates with those
of their own activities (sub-industry, type of mining, or whatever). The
differences in activity profit rates will partially reflect the differences
across firms in the factors above.
Then, using the same analysis as above, it follows that (i) if a firm's
realized profit rate is greater without exemption than the industry average,
it could not have been stimulated to invest by the exemption, since it
would have invested anyway; and (2) if a firm's realized profit rate is
less than the industry average even with exemption, it also could not
would have been at a CQ of .255. But at this CQ only 18 out of 78 firms, or 23 percent would
have been stimulated. We will argue below that it is probably not plausible to assume the
same CQ for all firms.
1 I. e., firms whose equity was below i million pesos in 1966.
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have been stimulated to invest by the exemption. Thus we consider a
firm's fixed investment to have been stimulated by the exemption if
and only if its profit rate without exemption would have been less than
the activity average, and its profit rate with exemption greater than its
activity average 1.
Now let us examine the data using the approach above under two
different meanings of the phrase "industiy average" in (2) above. We
Table 2 - A Comparison of the Profit Rates of Tax-Exempt Firms with
the Averagea for their Activity, 1963 and 1964
1963 1964
Firms with P'b > average for activity, without
exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 41
Firms with P' < average for activity, even with
exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 17
Firms in between (those "stimulated") . . . . . . . . 4 3
Firms with P' > average for all manufacturing,
without exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 42
Firms with P' < average for all manufacturing,
even with exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 15
Firms in between (those "stimulated") . . . . . . -.. 5 4
Corporations with P' > average for activity,
without exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 21
Corporations with P' < average for activity,
even with exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11
Corporations in between (those "stimulated").-.-.... 4 3
Corporations with P' > average for manufacturing,
without exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 17
Corporations with P' < average for manufacturing,
even with exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 14
Corporations in between (those "stimulated").-.-... - 5 .4
a For corporations only. - b P' indicates realized profit rate (on equity).
Source: Firm profit rate data: balance sheets and income statements supplied to Super-
intendency of Corporations (see the Appendix). - Industry profit rate data: Superintendency
of Corporations, Revista, 1964 and 1965.
1 It is important to realize that it is not entirely correct to utilize the profitability criterion
in complete isolation from liquidity considerations. If tax exemption raises a firm's profit
rate from below to above its CQ but the firm failed to invest during the exempt period, it
would seem excessively charitable to say that it was stimulated by profitability to invest.
Therefore we imposed a condition that the f 2 liquidity ratio (see Section V below) for the
firm must be at least .25.
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see from Table 2 above that comparing exempt firms to their own (Stand-
ard Industrial Trade Classification) two- or three-digit industry average,
only 4 out of 40 firms in 1963 and 3 out of 61 in 1964 could have been
stimulated to invest'. Thus less than io percent of the firms might have
been stimulated to invest, according to this approach.
However, one might question comparing firm profit rates to the average
for that kind of activity if one believes the entrepreneurial talents in
the firms are general, i. e., equally usable in other manufacturing activities.
If we compare individual firm profit rates to the average net profit rates
for all manufacturing corporations in 1963 (13.7 percent) and 1964
(12.7 percent) respectively, the results are approximately the same (see
Table 2). Note that this is identical to using the overall CQ approach devel-
oped above except that one specific CQ is used for all firms and only
the two years are used.
Furthermore, one might question the appropriateness of using profit
rate data of corporations as a basis for comparison when in fact about
40 percent (31 out of 78) of the firms are limited liability companies.
Unfortunately, no data on average profit rates of limited liability com-
panies were available. But we can carry out the analysis above for cor-
porations only. The results are then slightly more auspicious for the tax
exemption, but still only about 11 percent of the firm-years could have
been stimulated when the basis for comparison is the industry average,
and only 14 percent when the basis is the average for all manufacturing
corporations. (Notice that not one limited liability company was stimulat-
ed.)
None of the calculations above changes appreciably if the "stimulated"
and "non-stimulated" firms are weighted by value of exemption, invest-
ment, or equity. We thus conclude that it is unlikely that tax exemption
could have had profitability effects resulting in additional investment
on more than a small minority of the exempt firms2.
1 These were the latest years for which sufficiently disaggregated data on industry/
activity profit rates were available at this writing. The source is given in Table 2.
2 One reader suggested that tax-exempt firms would generally seem to be more risky
undertakings than the average (even for their own activity). Therefore we explored what
would happen if we added an allowance for risk differential. Since there seemed no obvious way
to quantify an appropriate average risk differential for exempt firms, we arbitrarily settled
upon a figure equal to about five percent of invested capital. The desirability of adding such
a differential was also indicated by the fact that many exempt firms realized low ex post
profits (5 percent on invested capital or even less) which they surely could not have expected
ex ante. The risk differential would then go part way towards compensating for our (necessary)
assumption that ex ante and ex post profits are equal in those (low ex post profit) firms for
which that assumption would seem implausible. The difference this makes is considerable:
31 to 36 percent of the corporation firm-years might have been stimulated (and 20 to 25
percent of the total). Nevertheless, the inclusion of such a large risk-differential (about
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V. Liquidity Effects on Investment
Unfortunately, to the extent businessmen do not make explicit
profitability calculations in determining their fixed investments, we must
be wary of accepting the conclusions of the previous section. And in fact
available evidence seems to indicate that most businessmen, even in
developed countries, either do not make explicit profitability estimates
to compare alternative projects, and/or are motivated more by considera-
tions other than profit maximization in undertaking their investments
1 :
Businessmen have always manifested a strong preference for financing
investment by internal funds. Where financial capital is scarce and capital
markets are as imperfect as they are in Colombia, one would expect
this preference to be even stronger. Interviews in Colombia supported
this hypothesis2.
Thus the survey evidence against profitability and in favor of liquidity
suggests that an important, if not the most important, impact of tax
exemption is to augment a firm's internal funds so that it can expand
more rapidly. If one sees availability of internal funds simply as one
of the variables in the investment decision function, then tax exemption
will always "stimulate" investment somewhat since it always increases
a firm's liquidity position somewhat3 . Initially, a stricter view will be
taken here, that internal funds affect the investment decision only as a
constraint. Under this view, if a firm's investment is less than the volume
of internal funds it would have had if it had paid taxes, then the addi-
tional liquidity bestowed upon it by tax exemption is deemed redundant.
25 percent of actual average realized profit rates) is not supported by the empirical evidence
which reveals that exempt corporations were slightly more profitable than the average for
all manufacturing (see p. 405).
1 The literature on this is too vast for more than a few references here. See George Katona
and James N. Morgan, "The Quantitative Study of Factors Determining Business Decisions",
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXVI, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, pp. 67sqq. - Joel
Dean, Capital Budgeting, Top-Management Policy on Plant, Equipment, and Product Devel-
opment, 3rd Print, New York, 1956, pp. 28sqq. - Gordon Donaldson, Corporate Debt
Capacity, A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity,
Boston, 1961. - Donald F. Istvan, "The Economic Evaluation of Capital Expenditures",
The Journal of Business, Vol. XXXIV, Chicago, Ill., 1961, pp. 45sqq. - For Latin America
in general see Albert Lauterbach, Enterprise in Latin A merica, Business Attitudes in a Devel-
oping Economy, Ithaca, New York, 1966. - For Colombia see Bilsborrow, op. cit., Ch. 4 and 5.
8 See Bilsborrow, op. cit., Appendix A. Also, in response to a mail questionnaire to all
corporations by the Department of Planning in 1965 the need for credit was the only "problem"
marked by over half the tax-exempt corporations responding (nine out of seventeen).
8 Except, of course, if the firm's profits were negative and hence its tax liabilities zero.
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To make this test it is convenient to define an "investment-internal
funds coefficient" (f) as follows:
Gross Investment
(7 =f After-Tax Internal Funds
where, for firms which were in fact tax exempt, "after-tax internal
funds" incorporates our estimate of the taxes the firm would have paid
if not exempt. When this f coefficient is less than one, it means that
investment has been less than after-tax internal funds, and we presume
that the additional liquidity due to the exemption has been redundant.
When f is greater than one, investment exceeds after-tax internal funds,
and we presume that the additional liquidity has, at least marginally,
made that investment possible.
Two different measures of f will be analyzed. In f, the after-tax internal
funds of each firm consist of its average1 after-tax profits and additions
to (depreciation and other) reserves; the investment of each firm is assumed
to consist of the average change in its fixed capital. f2 is the same as f1 except
that dividend payments are subtracted from after-tax internal funds.
This presumes that a firm has an obligation to distribute a portion of
profits to its shareholders before considering whether to invest the re-
mainder (i.e., its retained earnings)2.
The distribution of firms by f coefficient is shown in Table 3. The
critical distinction is between f's greater than one and less than one3 .
Notice that whether f, or f2 is used makes little difference: in either case,
more than six-sevenths of the firms failed to invest as much as the level
of gross internal funds they would have had even if they were not tax
exempt. In other words, average investment was less than average after-
tax internal funds. This would seem to indicate that tax exemption
1 For the years during 1960-66 for which data about the firm are available; the details
are described in the Appendix.
2 If the purpose of tax exemption is to stimulate investment through liquidity, one
wonders why the benefits are permitted to be distributed to shareholders at all. In Pakistan
dividends paid out of exempt profits were not exempt from the corporate income tax (Heller
and Kauffman, op. cit., p. 27).
S Actually, this is a bit too generous for the liquidity criterion: A firm is more likely, ce-
teris paribus, to have a high f if its level of internal funds (and hence profit rate) is very low.
In fact, if profits are negative and equal in absolute value to depreciation, the f ratio will be
infinite. Yet we would not want to say that investment had been stimulated because of a
high f. We will attempt to handle this problem by imposing the condition that the firm's
average profit rate without exemption be at least .03. Therefore, just as it was unrealistic
to consider the profitability criterion in complete isolation from liquidity, it is also unrealistic
to consider liquidity in complete isolation from profitability.
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Table 3 - Distribution of Firms by f Coefficients
Number of firms with
Talue of f f
coef- --- ---
ficient t corpo- limited corpor- limited
total rations liability largea total ations liability largea
companies companies
> 1.00 10 6 4 3 II 7 4 3
.75--99 4 4 0 I 5 5 0 2
< -75b 64 36 28 8 62 34 28 7
Total 78 46 32 12 78 46 32 12
a "Large" refers to firms with equity of over io million pesos (about $ i million) on December 31,
1966. All were corporations. - b Includes also eight firms with f's greater than .75 but profit rates
without exemption of less than .03 (see p. 414, footnote 3).
Source: Financial data supplied by firms. See the Appendix.
could have stimulated investment by relaxing a liquidity constraint for
only a small minority of the firms.
Further examination of the data indicates that the distribution of f
coefficients is not very different between firms established before and
after 1960, or between "basic" and "complementary" firms. Also there
was no noticeable difference between corporations and limited liability
companies, in contrast to what we observed before concerning profit-
ability effects of exemption. Both these results are somewhat surprising
since we would expect smaller firms, particularly limited liability com-
panies, to be more dependent on internal sources of funds, and hence
likely to "benefit" from exemptions, than larger firms. There appear
to be three reasons why this was not true: (1) limited liability companies
were much more profitable than corporations; (2) they increased their
capital stock at a slower rate than corporations; and (3) precisely because
of their less facile access to capital markets, they may have diverted
internal funds to working capital or precautionary balances.
Several criticisms can be levied against the liquidity approach used
here. One is that it is certainly oversimplified to presume that a firm
with an f greater than one was thereby necessarily stimulated to invest.
(This is similar to the regression fallacy of presuming that association
implies causation.) And, if it was, what proportion of investment was
stimulated - all, or only some part ? Available data do not permit
answers to this question. A further problem is that the relation between
investment and internal funds goes both ways. It is also true that
investment increases productive capacity, which may lead to higher
416 Richard E. Bilsborrow and Richard C. Porter
sales, profits, and internal funds. But since our time period is so short
and the time it takes for a new fixed investment to be profitable is often
two to three years (see p. 401, footnote 3), it seems likely that the
simultaneity problem is not very important here.
A final point is that it surely is arbitrary to choose i.oo as the deter-
mining f ratio if the average f ratio for all Colombian firms is less. A separate
study of 22 Colombian manufacturing corporations with far more reliable
data' than most (including this sample) found a median (also mean)
f ratio of .75. If we take .75 as the critical f, then all of the percentages
become slightly larger, but none is over 30 percent, except that about
35 to 40 percent of the larger corporations appear to have been stimulated.
Nevertheless, we should note that this approach would vitiate the "pure
liquidity" value of using the f's with one as the critical value. All it says
is that some combination of liquidity/profitability/etc. effects stimulated
these firms (with f's greater than .75) to invest more relative to internal
funds than the "average" in Colombia.
Thus we must conclude that the overall pattern of the f coefficients
is sufficiently consistent that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the large majority of firms - limited liability companies and corporations
alike - did not expand their fixed investment in the 1960's as a result
of the liquidity influence of any tax exemptions they received.
VI. Lessons from Colombian Experience
There remain two remediable shortcomings in the analysis of the
effects of exemption on profitability and liquidity above. The first is
that perhaps limited liability companies should be excluded since it is
fairly clear a priori that, given their low rate of taxation, the effects of
exemption on stimulating investment were unlikely to be significant2.
Suppose we now exclude them and work only with corporations. We
will further stratify corporations by value of exemptions received over
the period in order to discern whether firms that received larger exemptions
were more likely to be stimulated. A second shortcoming of the previous
analysis is that it considered the effects of exemption on profitability and
liquidity separately. Let us now proceed under the assumption that if
both the profitability and liquidity criteria are simultaneously satisfied
for a firm, then investment will be considered to have been stimulated
1 See Bilsborrow, op. cit., Ch. 4C. These 22 were chosen out of about 120 on the basis of
data completeness and compatibility.
S In fact, using the criteria developed in this paragraph, only four limited liability
companies out of the sample of 32 were stimulated by either criterion. This is because the
potential impact of exemption on the investment decision varies directly with the tax that
the firm would otherwise have to pay.
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Table 4 - Effects of Exemption in Stimulating Investment of Corporations
when Profitability and Liquidity Factors are Considered Simultaneously
Total value Total Number Number
of exemption Total stimulated stimulated Number Number
received n b by profit- by liquidity
(i,ooo pesos) corporations ability only only by both by neither
10,ooo plus . . . . 3 o I I I
5,0oo-9,999 . . . 6 o o I 5
2,000-4,999 . . . 7 I 0 0 6
1,000-1,999 . . . 6 2 0 0 4
500- 999 ... 6 0 1 o 5
100- 499 ... 8 4 1 0 3
1- 99 . . . 7 O I I 5
Totala . . . . . .  -.  43 7 4 3 29
a Four corporations, which received no exemption because of negative profits, are excluded
for obvious reasons.
by exemption; and if one of the criteria is fulfilled, but not both, then
investment may be considered to have been stimulated. For this purpose
the average firm profitability over the exempt period with and without
exemption will be compared with the manufacturing average, as described
above. The liquidity criterion will be based upon an f2 of 1.00, also as
discussed above. The results are summarized in Table 4. We therefore
conclude our empirical work with the statement that less than one-
third and possibly much less than one-third of the corporations were
stimulated to invest. The distribution of the proportion of those stimulat-
ed by value of exemptions received (about the same as by size of firm)
indicates that this percentage would be about the same if weighted.
This conclusion, however, is based upon the economic analyses in the
two previous sections and therefore subject to all the qualifications
expressed therein.
All of the preceding analysis leads to one conclusion - the Colombian
tax-exemption program has probably not been very effective. Even though
its administration considerably reduced its effectiveness, the economic
analysis above strongly suggests that, even well-administered, the pro-
gram might not have been effective'.
1 One might inquire as to what the benefit-cost ratio (or difference) is for tax exemption.
We found the ratio of investment stimulated to direct revenue loss to be less than one (around
2/3). However, this is really only a crude measure of the cost effectiveness of tax exemption,
and is not a benefit-cost ratio. As often found in the economic literature, such ratios typically
incorporate calculations of neither the "true" benefits nor the "true" costs, which should
1
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Lessons can be drawn from the Colombian experience at two levels:
first, where a government has decided upon some kind of tax-exemption
program, and seeks to operate it as effectively as possible; and second,
where a government is willing to consider alternative policies to exemp-
tion for achieving the same objectives. On the first level, the chances
for success of a tax-exemption program (similar to the present Colombian
program) can probably be increased with the following changes:
(i) The exemption system must be organized to provide prior and
certain tax exemption to qualified firms. The law must be issued before
the period of exemption begins, and it must spell out carefully who can
qualify, and how. Firms must be able to obtain government commit-
ments as to their tax status and the conditions which they must fulfill to
maintain this status; and they must be able to get this before they begin
(or expand) operations. Any subsequent annual examinations of the
firm should be intended solely to check fulfillment of the conditions.
(2) The governmental organization that confers tax exemption
should require from the exempt firms not only financial data of the
sort we obtained to make our investigation (profits, estimated income
tax liability, capital stock, depreciation, dividends, equity) but also
data on output, sales, employment, and proportion of raw materials
and capital goods of foreign vs. domestic origin. Only with such inf or-
mation is it possible to evaluate the economic effects of the exemption
program (including those beyond the effects on fixed investment considered
here). And without evaluation it takes on a mythical, prayerful quality.
(3) To stimulate investment the stimulus should be attached to
investment and not profits. In Colombia a very profitable firm which
invests little receives more exemption than a firm which makes low
profits but large investment expenditures. As long as income-tax exemp-
tion is used to attempt to stimulate investment (in contrast to alter-
natives discussed below), the latter type of company receives little benefit.
Thus it may be wise to place some kind of ceiling on the amount of exemp-
tion. In Colombia, for example, corporations should not have been exempt-
ed from the excess profits tax. In countries without an excess profits tax
only income up to some fraction of shareholder equity might be exempt
and the rest subject to taxation.
be measured by opportunity costs. For example, what is the cost to the economy of "invest-
ment stimulated ?" To begin with, some investment that would otherwise have occurred will
not now be undertaken. Determining this is not only virtually impossibble, but would con-
stitute only a first step: One would wish to calculate the benefits to society of that foregone
investment (and the benefits to society of the investment stimulated), which would in turn
require the determination of a large number of shadow prices. Similarly, the taxes foregone
do not constitute an opportunity cost.
The Effects of Tax Exemption on Investment by Industrial Firms in Colombia 419
(4) The present exemption system has largely failed to encourage
entry in thoroughly new and untried areas. Exemption alone will often
be inadequate in such areas, and the government must seek other, more
direct stimuli, either in addition to or in place of exemption.
(5) Since tax exemption is presumably a reward for doing something
other than only making profits, the recipient firm should be subjected
to conditions beyond type of product and national raw material content.
For example, it might be required to prove that its production or employ-
ment had risen by a certain percentage over the previous year'. More
important, it might be required to invest an amount equal to some frac-
tion of its tax savings2 . Also, income distributed as dividends might
be excluded from exemption.
For tax exemption to be effective, the critical determinants of the
investment decision ought to be known better than they are at present.
The details of the exemption system could then be tailored to this knowl-
edge. It is also important for a country to know what its industrialization
goals are, and how exemptions can help achieve those goals. Once the
goals are made explicit, however, it is likely that tax exemption will no
longer appear the best policy for achieving them. For example, in Co-
lombia, the chief purposes of exemptions appear to be: (a) to encourage
investment in general, and in certain activities in particular; (b) to induce
an increase in output in specific fields; and (c) to reduce imports.
Various policies that directly strive for each of these objectives are
available; some illustrations are given below:
(a) To encourage investment in general3 , accelerated depreciation
or investment tax credits can be applied, without extensive adminis-
trative problems and without discrimination between firms. A higher
tax credit could be given for companies in "basic" industries, etc. The
1 In view of large-scale unemployment in many less developed countries, A. R. Prest
suggested subsidied bases on the number of workers employed rather than on fixed invest-
ment. See his A Fiscal Survey of the British Caribbean, Colonial Research Studies No. 23, Lon-
don, 1957, esp. pp. 28, 102. - See also J. E. Meade, "Mauritius: A Case Study in Malthusian
Economics", The Economic Journal, Vol. LXXI, London, 1961, pp. 521sqq., esp. p. 529.
To the extent capital and labor are used in fixed proportions, the two may be equivalent.
2 Of course, this does not mean that fraction would be considered to have been stimulated
by exemption since the firm would certainly have invested some amount anyway. But at
least such a provision would insure some minimal f coefficient.
3 It is not at all obvious that this is desirable in Colombia since there is widespread excess
capacity already. In fact, this excess capacity may have resulted partly from another device
which subsidizes investment in general in Colombia - the favorable exchange rate for imports
of capital goods.
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advantage of a tax credit is that it rewards companies in proportion to
their investment, not their profitability1.
(b) To induce an increase in output in specific sectors (whose growth
would not otherwise occur), direct output subsidies can be offered. These
have the benefit of rewarding, not profits but production; furthermore,
they offer rewards to low profit firms where exemption does not, and offer
ever smaller rewards (after taxes) as firms become more profitable. In
particular, to stimulate steel production it can be argued that a direct
subsidy to Paz del Rio would be more effective than giving tax exemption
to buyers of its products2.
(c) If by "basic", the government means import saving, then such
a definition should be put in the law, and firms should receive status
on the basis of their ability to prove net import saving. The impact of
the exemption on the balance of payments could be greater if all firms
1 Numerous articles have been published in recent years comparing various tax devices
for stimulating investment on an a priori basis. See E. Cary Brown, "Tax Incentives for In-
vestment", The American Economic Review, Vol. LII, 1962, Papers and Proceedings, pp.
335 sqq. - Richard Goode, "Accelerated Depreciation Allowances as a Stimulus to Invest-
ment", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIX, 1955, pp. 191 sqq. - Robert E. Hall
and Dale W. Jorgenson, "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior", The American Economic
Review, Vol. LVII, 1967, pp. 391 sqq. - In fact it can be shown mathematically that tax
credits for investment are likely to stimulate more investment per unit of revenue loss than
other similar devices. See J. Black, "Investment Allowances, Initial Allowances and Cheap
Loans as Means of Encouraging Investment", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XXVII,
Cambridge, 1959-1960, pp. 44sqq. On behalf of tax exemption, however, one might add
that, unlike tax credits and accelerated depreciation allowances, it does not discriminate in
favor of capital-intensive methods of production.2 Since the tax exemption of "basic" firms can be easily compared to various alternatives
(e. g., subsidized credit or straight subsidies based on output - see Section VI), no
special theoretical analysis is necessary. However, this is not true of "complementary"
exemption since it has the two-fold purpose of stimulating not only the growth of "complemen-
tary" firms but also of Paz del Rio. It can be shown (see R. Porter, The Effectiveness of Tax
Exemption in Colombia, Center for Research on Economic Development, Discussion Paper
No. 8, July, 1969) that the "complementary" firm gains more from the exemption system if
Paz del Rio costs are variable and gains more from a tax-cum-subsidy if they are fixed.
Furthermore, those steel-using firms which buy less than half their raw materials from Paz
del Rio do not qualify for tax exemption as "complementary" and hence they (and/or their
customers) are better off under the tax-cum-subsidy system, in which Paz del Rio prices are
(at least somewhat) lower. Similarly, "complementary" firms (1) that are not very profitable
and/or (2) whose costs are very largely composed of their Paz del Rio purchases, will prefer
the tax-cum-subsidy system since, in the first case, loss of tax exemption costs them little, and
in the second, lower Paz del Rio prices are more important. Thus, the only firms that would
prefer the present tax-exemption program are those that (1) are very profitable and/or (2)
buy just over half their raw materials after exemption from Paz del Rio. The present exemp-
tion program offers incentives only to firms that can reach the magic 5o percent Paz-del-
Rio-purchase level, and then it offers no incentive to exceed that level. A tax-cum-subsidy
sytem stimulates all firms to begin to use, and use more, Paz del Rio products.
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were required to decrease their percentage (or, better, the total amount)
of imported materials used each year, or forsake a certain percentage
of the exemption. A simple example of such a provision would require
that either the percentage imported or the value of the exemption decline
by, say, five percentage points each year. This would ensure that the
exemption would disappear after a fixed number of years and also impose
a limit on the extent to which such import-content protection could
disrupt comparative advantage'.
There are many advantages to indirect industrial policies, not the least
of which is that they use, rather than obstruct, the workings of markets
and that they usually require fewer scarce administrative resources.
But in the realm of tax exemptions, indirectness is no virtue. The fewer
the tenuous links such policy relies on, the less likely-it is to fail2. Where the
links between tax exemption and industrial goals cannot be tightly forged,
other policies should be sought that offer inducement nearer the point
where reaction is desired.
VII. Appendix: Sources of Data and Definitions of Variables
All firms, both corporations and limited liability companies, which
enjoy exemptions as "basic" or "complementary" firms are required
to submit to the "vigilance" of the Superintendency of Corporations. In
practice this has meant only the exempt firms must annually file balance
sheets and income statements with the Superintendency.
In fact, not all exempt corporations file every year. For example,
for the 53 corporations which were exempt at one time or another (accord-
ing to resolutions of the Ministry of Development), there should be on
file 288 corporation-years of balance sheets and income statements
during the years, 1960-66. Seventy-five of these - more than one-fourth
- were not locatable in the archives of the Superintendency; while some
were presumably lost, a large number were probably never filed. This
is surprising since all corporations are required by law to file these forms
every year.
1 See Bernard Munk, "The Welfare Cost of Content Protection: The Automotive Industry
in Latin America", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXXVII, Chicago, Ill., 1969,
pp. 85sqq.
2 And the easier it is to know when it has failed - and this latter is no trivial considera-
tion. This conclusion is supported by the comprehensive work of Gunnar Myrdal on South
Asia where discretionary controls over the private sector have proliferated in ever-increasing
fashion, with concomitant reductions in their effectiveness and administrability. See his
Asian Drama, An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, A Twentieth Century Fund Study,
London, 1968, Vol. II, Ch. 19, and Vol. III, Appendix 8.
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Even more surprising is the fact that the 45 exempt limited liability
companies were more responsible than the corporations in filing these
forms; the former even filed 35 times when they were not exempt (according
to resolutions of the Ministry of Development). In the case of "comple-
mentary" firms, this largely reflects the fact that many firms receive
this exemption without a resolution from the Ministry of Development.
In the case of "basic" firms, this reflects the delay and uncertainty in-
volved in getting exempted. The limited liability companies which were
at-some-time-exempt as "basic" firms applied for exemption 69 times but
(eventually) received it only 49 times, or 71 percent of the time. This
lends support to the .66 figure in the text as an estimate of the probability
of re-exemption.
Although the information which is filed is amazingly detailed, it is
recognized that it is not always accurate or even honest'. But to correct
it would have been difficult if not impossible. Accordingly, it was decided
to make no changes in the information submitted by the firms (except
that reclassifications of items by the Superintendency were usually accept-
ed).
From each firm's submission for each year, five pieces of information
were taken:
E = Shareholders' "equity" (at the end of the year, excluding re-
tained earnings of that year). This is approximately net wealth,
or total assets minus current and accrued liabilities.
K = Fixed, depreciable assets (at the end of the year, valued at cost
of acquisition and undepreciated).
P = Profits (after depreciation, net of provisions for corporate income
taxes).
T = Provisions for that year's corporate income taxes. The sum of P
and T, labeled P', is therefore before-tax profits.
D = Depreciation and other additions to reserves (i. e., cash inflows
not counted as profits).
The empirical work is based on a sample of 78 of the ioo at-some-
time-exempt firms (as "basic" or "complementary", according to resolu-
tions of the Ministry of Development). Twenty-two firms were excluded
because the Superintendency did not have usable records for two or more
years of actual production during the 1960-66 period. The number of
observations (i. e., years) per firm in the sample ranges from two to seven
1 The data are not used to check tax declarations, import license applications, etc.,
but the firms cannot be sure of that.
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and averages about four. The distribution of these firms between corpora-
tions and limited liability companies, and between "basic" and "com-
plementary" firms is shown in Table A.
Table A - Distribution of Sample Firms by Type of Exemption and
Business Form
Number of firms in sample that are
"basic"a "complementary"
Corporations . . . . . . . -... 34 13
Limited liability companies . . . . 17 14
a Two firms were at various times both "basic" and "complementary." They are
treated throughout as "basic."
For the profitability analysis of Section IV, two profit rates are cal-
culated: (i) the before-tax profit rate on equity, P'/E, and (2) the after-
tax profit rate on equity, (P'-H)/E, where H is the amount of corporate
taxes the firm would have paid if not exempt (i. e., the value of the exemp-
tion to the firm).
To simplify the task of calculating H, we assumed that P' was the
correct income on which to base the income tax and E the correct wealth
on which to base the excess profits tax. These assumptions may lead to
a slight overestimate of H1. Further, only the two principal corporate
taxes (i. e., income tax and excess profit tax) were calculated; since there
are several other minor corporate taxes, this leads to an underestimate of
H. These biases are both small and fortunately partially offset each other.
To calculate the before-tax and after-tax profit rates referred to in the
text, the (between two and seven) observations of P' /E and (P' - H)/E
are simply averaged for each firm 2. Two comments are necessary about
our calculations of profit rates. First, to the extent that the profits of
exempt firms were reduced because of the adjustments they had to make
to meet the (usually 6o percent) national-content requirements for
exemption, their before-tax profit rates would have been higher if they had
not been exempt. And second, the profits of exempt firms may have been
intentionally overstated, to the extent that such firms (i) are sure they
will receive exemption, (2) have accounting leeway in their profit-and-loss
1 Since certain parts of gross income (e. g., dividend income from other corporations)
and equity are exempt from income and excess profits taxes, respectively.
2 Only in rare cases did this require linear interpolation over more than one year for any
firm.
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statements, and (3) wish to declare large profits during their exempt
years in order to build up a large equity base for their later non-exempt
years in which they (if corporations) would be subject to excess profits
taxes ("excess" being determined by the size of the equity base). Needless
to say, it is almost impossible to guess to what extent such biases exist.
But we can derive some comfort from the fact the effects of the national-
content requirement and any intentional overstating of profits would
have opposite and hence partly self-cancelling effects on the actual firm
profit rate data used.
In the liquidity analysis of Section V, use is made of D as well as P'
and H to form estimates of the internal funds available to the firm;
it is important to include D in the measure of internal funds because
it is a source of (investible) funds just as net profits is. For the years in
which there are data, a simple average of the values of D, P', and H is
calculated. The firm's average change in K, written k, is simply the differ-
ence between K in the last year (for which there are data) and K in the
first year (for which there are data) divided by the number of years be-
tween the two observations. It is these averages of D, P', and k that
are used to calculate the f values in the text. The formulas are:
(A-1) f = P' -- H + D '
(A-2) f2 = (1- v) (P' -H) + D'
where v is the proportion of after-tax income paid out in dividends,
or the dividend payout rate. The rationalizations for f, and f2 are given
in Section V of the text. Since it was not always possible to obtain data
on dividends, we resorted to the following procedure: (i) where actual
data was available, it was used and therefore implicitly accepted as
correct (13 corporations); otherwise, (2) where ownership of firms was
widespread1 a payout rate of .5 was used (10 corporations); (3) where
ownership was concentrated, .2 was used (24 corporations and all 31 limited
1 Firms were considered as having "widespread" ownership if they had at least twenty
stockholders, with no three together owning over half the stock. (This definition is partly
necessitated by availability of data on ownership characteristics in the Revista of the Super-
intendency of Corporations.) In such a situation there may be an obligation on the part of
the managers to distribute sufficient dividends to keep the owners satisfied. Evidence on the
thirteen firms in this sample for which there were data, plus that published on members of
the Bogoti Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores), indicates that our procedure is sufficiently
generous. It may overstate dividends, which would further strengthen our argument in the
text.
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liability companies). We believe this procedure is sufficiently generous to
incorporate any "obligations" to shareholders - i. e., any prior claims
on otherwise potentially investible funds. While our procedure is not
as precise as one would wish, the results (the differences between fl and f2)
are very insensitive to it (see Section V).
There are three obvious objections to our procedure for calculating
the f's. First, any comparison of a firm's internal funds and its investment
presupposes a consistent theory concerning the timing with which funds
are used for investment. The above procedure is not consistent on this
score, but is used on the grounds that any inconsistency would generally
be of small quantitative importance, and that any loss of observations
about P', D, and H would be more serious1.
Second, the simple averaging of P', D, and H observations (or, in the
case of K, differencing) takes no account of inflation during the period;
but it is not clear what account one wishes to take or even if account
should be taken. The f coefficients do tell us something about the destina-
tion (fixed investment or not) of the average peso (not the average real
peso) of internal funds.
Finally, all calculations are constructed from the data of years in
which the firm reported to the Superintendency. It is necessarily assumed
that there are no biases introduced by the absence of data for other years
(or by the absence of firms for which there were insufficient records).
*
Zusammenfassung: Die Wirkungen von Steuerbefreiungen fur Investitionen
durch Industrieunternehmungen in Kolumbien. - In der vorliegenden Abhandlung
werden die Auswirkungen von Steuerbefreiungen in Kolumbien wAhrend der Jahre
1960-1966 untersucht, um ein stichhaltiges empirisches Beweismaterial fur die
Diskussion zur Verfngung zu stellen. Die grundlegende Frage ist: In welchem Aus-
maB haben die Steuerbefreiungen Kolumbiens Unternehmungen ermutigt, ihre
Titigkeit in industriellen Bereichen aufzunehmen (oder auszudehnen), die sie sonst
nicht gewahlt hatten ?
Die Untersuchung ist wie folgt gegliedert: Abschnitt I gibt einen historischen
Hintergrund fnr das Steuerbefreiungsgesetz aus dem Jahr 1960. Abschnitt II bietet
eine kurze Obersicht fiber gewisse Verwaltungsverfahren und -probleme. Die Ab-
schnitte III bis V enthalten die 6konomische Beweisfnhrung und Abschnitt VI
faft schlieBlich diese Beweise zusammen und zieht aus ihnen die wirtschaftspoliti-
schen SchluBfolgerungen.
*
1 When gross fixed investment was regressed on internal funds and other variables
in the study of 68 Colombian manufacturing corporations (see p. 403, footnotes 2 and 3),
the optimal lag structure on the internal funds variable was found to be one year. But the
difference between a one-year lag and no lag was small.
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R6sum6: L'influence des exemptions d'imp6ts sur l'investissement des entre-
prises industrielles en Colombie. - Afin d'apporter a la discussion des preuves empiri-
ques plus explicites, on examine dans cet article les effets qu'ont eu les exemptions
d'impots en Colombie pendant les anndes de 1960 A 1966. La question de base est de
savoir en quelle mesure les exemptions d'imp6ts en Colombie ont encourage les
entreprises a entrer (ou a s'6tendre) dans des domaines industriels que, sans cela,
elles n'auraient pas choisis.
L'6tude s'organise de la maniere suivante: La Section I donne un rdsum4 des
causes historiques de la loi des exemptions d'imp6ts de l'annde 1960. La Section II
examine brievement certains proc6dds et problemes administratifs. Les Sections III
a V contiennent les faits dconomiques. La Section VI, enfin, resume les faits et en
tire les consdquences de politique 6conomique.
Resume n: El impacto de la exoneraci6n de impuestos sobre la inversi6n indu-
strial en Colombia. - En el presente articulo se estudia el resultado de la exoneraci6n
de impuestos en Colombia durante los aios 196o-1966 con el fin de ampliar la base
empirica para la discusi6n de este tema. Concretamente se trata de averiguar hasta
qu6 punto las exoneraciones impositivas han inducido en Colombia a empresarios a
iniciar (o ampliar) actividades en el sector industrial que en otro caso no hubieran
efectuado.
En el primer capitulo, los autores recuerdan los antecedentes hist6ricos de la ley
de exoneraci6n de impuestos del aio 1960. El segundo capitulo contiene un breve
sumario de diversos precedimientos y problemas administrativos. Los capitulos 3-5
presentan el anAlisis econ6mico, mientras que en el capitulo sexto se resumen los
resultados y se trata de sacar algunas conclusiones politico-econ6micas.
*
Riassunto: Gli effetti di esenzioni fiscali per investimenti da parte di imprese
industriali in Colombia. - Nel presente saggio sono esaminate le ripercussioni di
esenzioni fiscali in Colombia durante gli anni 1960-1966 per mettere un consistente
materiale di prova empirico a disposizione della discussione. La questione fonda-
mentale e: In che misura le esenzioni fiscali della Colombia hanno incoraggiato
imprese ad iniziare (o allargare) le loro attivita in settori industriali che altrimenti
non avrebbero scelto ?
L'indagine 6 articolata come segue: Il capitolo primo offre uno sfondo storico
alla legge di esenzione fiscale dell'anno 1960. Il secondo capitolo fa una breve sintesi
di certi problemi e procedimenti amministrativi. I capitoli terzo fino al quinto
contengono la deduzione delle prove economiche ed il capitolo sesto infine riassume
queste prove e ricava da esse le conseguenze di politica economica.
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